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Abstract
We study a two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential game where one player controls
the state variable via additive impulses while the other player can stop the game at any time.
The main goal of this work is characterize Nash equilibria through a verification theorem, which
identifies a new system of quasi-variational inequalities whose solution gives equilibrium payoffs
with the correspondent strategies. Moreover, we apply the verification theorem to a game with a
one-dimensional state variable, evolving as a scaled Brownian motion, and with linear payoff and
costs for both players. Two types of Nash equilibrium are fully characterized, i.e. semi-explicit
expressions for the equilibrium strategies and associated payoffs are provided. Both equilibria are
of threshold type: in one equilibrium players’ intervention are not simultaneous, while in the other
one the first player induces her competitor to stop the game. Finally, we provide some numerical
results describing the qualitative properties of both types of equilibrium.
Keywords and phrases: controller-stopper games, stochastic differential games, impulse con-
trols, quasi-variational inequalities, Nash equilibrium.
MSC 2010 classification: 91A15, 91B70, 93E20.
1 Introduction
Controller-stopper games are two-player stochastic dynamic games whose payoffs depend on the evo-
lution over time of some state variable, one player can control its dynamics while the other player can
stop the game. The study of these games started with Maitra and Sudderth’s work [23] on a zero-sum
discrete time setting. Later on, many authors investigated such games in continuous time, especially
in the zero-sum case, while very little has been done in the nonzero-sum. Indeed, apart from Karatzas
and Sudderth [17], all the other articles focus on the zero-sum case and in all of them the controller
uses regular controls, i.e. absolutely continuous for the Lebesgue measure. Here we mention Karatzas
and Sudderth [18], who derived the explicit solution for a game with a one-dimensional diffusion with
absorption at the endpoints of a bounded interval as a state process; Karatzas and Zamfirescu [20, 21]
developed a martingale approach to a general class of controller-stopper games, while Bayraktar and
Huang [5] showed that the value functions of such games is the unique viscosity solution to an ap-
propriate Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. Moreover, Hernandez et al. [16] have analysed the case
when the controller plays singular controls and derived a set of variational inequalities characterizing
the games value functions. On the whole, this class of games is motivated by a variety of applica-
tions in finance, insurance and economics. In view of this we quote Bayraktar et al. [6] on convex
risk measures, Nutz and Zhang [24] on sub-hedging of American options under volatility uncertainty,
Bayraktar and Young [7] on minimization of lifetime ruin probability and Karatzas and Wang [19] on
pricing and hedging of American contingent claims among others.
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Here, we consider the case of a controller facing fixed and proportional costs every time he moves
the state variable, so that intervening continuously over time is clearly not feasible for him. In this
context, the controller will make use of impulse controls, which are sequences of interventions times
and corresponding intervention sizes, describing when and by how much will the controlled process be
shifted. This kind of controls look like the natural choice in many concrete applications, from finance
to energy markets and to real options. For this reason, they have been experiencing a comeback due
to a demand for more realistic financial models (e.g. fixed transaction costs and liquidity risk), see for
instance [3, 9, 10, 12, 13, 22].
Impulse controls have been studied in stochastic differential games as well and, as in the controller-
stopper case, most of the research has been done in the zero-sum framework. For this reason, it is
worth mentioning the work by Aïd et al. [1], who developed a general model for non-zero sum impulse
games implementing a verification theorem which provides an appropriate system of quasi-variational
inequalities for the equilibrium payoffs and related strategies of the two players. Thereafter, Ferrari
and Koch [15] produced a model of pollution control where the two players, the regulator and the
energy producer, are assumed to face proportional and fixed costs and, as such, play an impulse
nonzero-sum game which admits an equilibrium under some suitable conditions. Lastly, Basei et
al. [4] studied the mean field game version of the nonzero-sum impulse game in [1] and proved the
existence of -Nash equilibrium for the corresponding N -player game. Regarding the zero-sum case,
here we quote Cosso [14], who examined a finite time horizon two-player game where both players act
via impulse control strategies and showed that such games have a value which is the unique viscosity
solution of the double-obstacle quasi-variational inequality. Furthermore, Azimzadeh [2] considered
an asymmetric setting with one participant playing a regular control while the opponent is playing
an impulse control with precommitment, meaning that at the beginning of the game the maximum
number of impulses is declared, and proved that such a game has a value in the viscosity sense.
This paper is at the crossroad of the two streams of research we have discussed above: stopper-
controller games and impulse games. Indeed, we study an impulse controller-stopper nonzero-sum
game, focusing on the mathematical properties of Nash equilibria, while application to economics and
finance are postponed to future research. Turning to the game’s description, we consider a nonzero-
sum stochastic differential game between two players, P1 and P2, where P1 can use impulse controls
to affect a continuous-time stochastic process X while P2 can stop the game at any time. When
P1 does not intervene, we assume X to diffuse according to a time homogeneous multidimensional
diffusion process. Moreover, every time P1 intervenes she faces a cost, say φ(Xτn−, δn) which may
depend on the impulse size and on the state variable right before intervention. At the same time P2
can get something, say ψ(Xτn−, δn). P1’s strategy is any sequence u = (τn, δn)n≥1, of intervention
times, τn, and corresponding impulses δn, whereas P2’s strategy is any [0,∞]-valued stopping time η.
Both players want to maximize their expected payoffs which are defined for every initial state x ∈ Rd
and every couple (u, η) as follows:
J1(x;u, η) = E
∫ η
0
e−r1tf(Xx,ut )dt−
∑
n:τn≤η
e−r1τnφ(Xτn−, δn) + e
−r1ηh(Xη)1(η<∞)
 ,
J2(x;u, η) = E
∫ η
0
e−r2tg(Xx,ut )dt+
∑
n:τn≤η
e−r2τnψ(Xτn−, δn) + e
−r2ηk(Xη)1(η<∞)
 ,
so apart from the costs (and gains) induced by the intervention of P1, the players have running as well
as terminal gains. We are going to adopt a PDE-based approach to characterize the Nash equilibria
of this game, identifying a suitable system of quasi-variational inequalities (QVI’s, for short) whose
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solution will give equilibrium payoffs. In this setting, the relevant QVI’s system is as follows
MV1 − V1 ≤ 0 in Rd
V2 − k ≥ 0 in Rd
HV2 − V2 = 0 in {MV1 − V1 = 0}
V1 = h in {V2 = k}
max{AV1 − r1V1 + f,MV1 − V1} = 0 in {V2 > k}
max{AV2 − r2V2 + g, k − V2} = 0 in {MV1 − V1 < 0}
where M and H are suitable intervention operators defined in Section 2.1. One of the main contri-
butions of this paper consists in the Verification Theorem 2.1 establishing that if two functions V1
and V2 are regular enough and they are solution to the system above, then they coincide with some
equilibrium payoff functions of the game and a characterization of the related equilibrium strategies
is possible.
Furthermore, building on the verification theorem, we present an example of solvable impulse
controller and stopper game. More in detail, we consider a game with a one-dimensional state variable
X, modelled as a real-valued (scaled) Brownian motion. Both players have linear running payoffs.
When P1 intervenes, he faces a penalty while P2 faces a gain, both characterized by a fixed and a
variable part, proportional to the size of the impulse. Moreover, when P2 stops the game, he may
suffer a loss proportional to the state variable, while P1 might gain something proportional to X as
well. Hence, the players objective functions are:
J1(x;u, η) = Ex
∫ η
0
e−rt(Xt − s)dt−
∑
n:τn≤η
e−rτn(c+ λ|δn|) + ae−rηXη1{η<∞}
 ,
J2(x;u, η) = Ex
∫ η
0
e−rt(q −Xt)dt+
∑
n:τn≤η
e−rτn(d+ γ|δn|)− be−rηXη1{η<∞}
 ,
with suitable coefficients satisfying some assumptions that will be specified later. Some preliminary
heuristics on the QVIs above leads us to consider two pairs of candidates for the functions Vi. Then, a
careful application of the verification theorem shows that such candidates actually coincide with some
equilibrium payoff functions. In particular, we are able to identify two kinds of Nash equilibria, both
of threshold type, that can be shortly described as follows:
(i) in the first type of equilibrium, P1 intervenes when the state X is smaller than some threshold
x¯1 and moves the process to some endogenously determined target x∗1, while P2 terminates the
game when the state X is bigger than some x¯2; in this kind of equilibrium the optimal target of
P1, x∗1, is strictly smaller than x¯2, so the two players intervene separately.
(ii) In the second type, P1 intervenes when the state X is smaller than some (possibly different)
threshold x¯1 and move the state variable to the intervention region of P2, who is then forced by
P1 to end the game. In this case, players’ interventions are simultaneous.
We provide quasi-explicit expressions for the value functions and for the thresholds x¯i, x∗1 for both
equilibria. Finally, we perform some numerical experiments providing several cases when one of the
two equilibria emerges. The question if there are cases when the two types of equilibria can coexist is
still open.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives the general formulation of impulse controller and
stopper game, in particular the notion of admissible strategies, and more importantly we state and
prove a verification theorem giving sufficient condition in terms of the system of QVIs for a given couple
of payoffs to be a Nash equilibrium. In Section 3 we consider the one-dimensional example with linear
payoffs and provide quasi-explicitly characterizations for the two types of Nash equilibria sketched
above. Finally, some numerical experiments illustrate the qualitative behaviour of such equilibria.
3
2 Description of the game
In this section we have gathered all main theoretical results on a general class of nonzero-sum impulse
controller and stopper games. We start with a detailed description of the game, together with all
technical assumptions and the definition of admissible strategies.
Let (Ω,F,P) be a probability space equipped with a complete and right-continuous filtration F =
(Ft)t≥0. On this space we consider the uncontrolled state variable X ≡ Xx defined as solution of the
following time-homogeneous SDE:
dXt = b(Xt)dt+ σ(Xt)dWt, X0− = x, (2.1)
where (Wt)t≥0 is an F-Brownian motion and the coefficients b : Rd → Rd and σ : Rd → Rd×k are
assumed to be globally Lipschitz continuous, i.e. there exists a constant C > 0 such that for all
x1, x2 ∈ Rd we have:
|b(x1)− b(x2)|+ |σ(x1)− σ(x2)| ≤ C|x1 − x2|,
so that existence of a unique strong solution is granted and X is well-defined. We consider two players,
that we call P1 and P2. Equation (2.1) describes the evolution of the state process in case of no
intervention from both players. During the game, P1 can affect X’s dynamics applying some impulse
δ ∈ Z in an additive fashion, moving the state variable from Xτ− to its new value Xτ = Xτ− + δ,
where τ denotes the intervention time. The controlled state variable will be denoted by Xx,u:
Xx,ut = x+
∫ t
0
b(Xx,us )ds+
∫ t
0
σ(Xx,us )dWs +
∑
n:τn≤t
δn, t ≥ 0.
On the other hand, P2 can stop the game by choosing any stopping time η with values in [0,∞]. We,
now, give a proper definition of such strategies.
Definition 2.1 Let Z ⊆ Rd be given. P1’s strategy is any sequence u = (τn, δn)n≥0, where (τn)n≥0
is a sequence of stopping times such that 0 = τ0 < τ1 < τ2 < . . . < τn ↑ ∞ and δn ∈ L0(Fτn)
with δn : Rd → Z. P2’s strategy is any stopping time η ∈ T , where T is the set of all [0,∞]-valued
F-stopping times.
Remark 2.1 We observe that simultaneous interventions are possible in this game. This is in contrast
with games where both players intervenes with impulses, where simultaneous interventions are usually
not allowed since they would be very difficult to handle with from a modelling perspective (cf. [1]).
On the other hand here, due to the different nature of the strategies for the two players, one can safely
allow for simultaneous actions. This has an interesting consequence on our analysis, as we will see in
the linear game of the next section that at least two types of Nash equilibria are possible and in one
of them P1 induces P2 to stop instantaneously.
The players want to maximize their respective objectives, featuring each of them three discounted
terms: a running payoff, P1’s intervention cost/gain and a terminal payoff. The players’ discount
factors can be different of each other. More precisely, for each i = 1, 2, ri > 0 denotes the discount
rate of player i, f, g : Rd → R are their running payoffs, h, k : Rd → R their terminal payoffs and
φ, ψ : Rd × Z → R are the intervention cost and gain, respectively. Throughout the whole paper,
we will work under the assumption that all these functions are continuous. Hence, we can define the
payoffs as follows.
Definition 2.2 Let x ∈ Rd, let (u, η) be a pair of strategies. Provided that the right-hand sides exist
and are finite we set:
J1(x;u, η) = Ex
∫ η
0
e−r1tf(Xx,ut )dt−
∑
n:τn≤η
e−r1τnφ(Xx,u
τ−n
, δn) + e
−r1ηh(Xx,uη )1(η<∞)

J2(x;u, η) = Ex
∫ η
0
e−r2tg(Xx,ut )dt+
∑
n:τn≤η
e−r2τnψ(Xx,u
τ−n
, δn) + e
−r2ηk(Xx,uη )1(η<∞)
 ,
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where the subscript in the expectation denotes the conditioning with respect to the starting point.
In order for J1 and J2 to be well defined, we now introduce the set of admissible strategies.
Definition 2.3 Let x ∈ Rd be some initial state and let (u, η) be some strategy profile. We say that
the pair (u, η) is x-admissible if:
(i) the following random variables are all in L1(Ω):∫ ∞
0
e−r1t|f(Xx,ut )|dt,
∫ ∞
0
e−r2t|g(Xx,ut )|dt,
e−r1η|h(Xx,uη )|, e−r2η|k(Xx,uη )|,∑
k:τk≤∞
e−r1τk |φ(Xx,u
τ−k
, δk)|,
∑
k:τk≤∞
e−r2τk |ψ(Xx,u
τ−k
, δk)|;
(ii) for each p ∈ N, the random variable ‖Xx,u‖∞ = supt≥0|Xx,ut | is in Lp(Ω).
We denote by Ax the set of all x-admissible pairs.
Remark 2.2 Notice that, as it is formulated above, admissibility is a joint condition on the strategies
of both players. Under condition (ii) above and if all functions f , g, h, k, φ and ψ have at most
polynomial growth in their respective variables, the set of all jointly admissible strategies can be
expressed as A1x × A2x = Ax, where Aix denotes Pi’s set of (individually) admissible strategies for
i = 1, 2, and is defined as follows: A1x is the set of all P1’s strategies u = (τn, δn)n≥0 such that∑
n≥0 |δn| ∈ Lp(Ω) for all p ≥ 1, while A2x is the set of all [0,∞]-values stopping times.
Indeed, for P1’s strategies for instance, using classical a-priori Lp-estimates of the (uncontrolled)
state variable, there exists a constant c > 0 such that
E
[
e−r1η|h(Xη)|
] ≤ cE [e−r1η(1 + |Xη|p)] ≤ c(1 + E[‖X‖p∞]) <∞.
Moreover, similar estimates can be performed for the other expectations in Definition 2.3(i).
We conclude this section with the classical definition of Nash equilibrium and the corresponding
equilibrium payoffs.
Definition 2.4 (Nash Equilibrium) Given x ∈ Rd, we say that (u, η) ∈ Ax is a Nash equilibrium if
J1(x;u
∗, η∗) ≥ J1(x;u, η∗), for all u s.t. (u, η∗) ∈ Ax,
J2(y;u
∗, η∗) ≥ J2(x;u∗, η), for all η s.t. (u∗, η) ∈ Ax.
Finally, the equilibrium payoffs of any Nash equilibrium (u∗, η∗) ∈ Ax are defined as
Vi(x) := Ji(x;u
∗, η∗), i = 1, 2.
2.1 The system of quasi-variational inequalities
Now, we are going to introduce the differential problem that will be satisfied by the equilibrium payoff
functions of our game. Let V1, V2 : Rd → R be two measurable functions such that
{δ(x)} = argmaxδ∈Z{V1(x+ δ)− φ(x, δ)}, x ∈ Rd, (2.2)
for some measurable function δ : Rd → Z. Moreover we define the following two intervention operators:
MV1(x) = V1(x+ δ(x))− φ(x, δ(x)), (2.3)
HV2(x) = V2(x+ δ(x)) + ψ(x, δ(x)), (2.4)
for each x ∈ Rd.
The expressions in (2.2), (2.3) and (2.4) have the following natural interpretation:
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(2.2) let x be the current state of the process, if P1 intervenes immediately with impulse δ(x), P1’s
payoff after intervention changes to V1(x + δ(x)) − φ(x, δ(x)), given by the payoff in the new
state minus the intervention cost. Therefore, δ(x) in (2.2) is the optimal impulse that P1 would
apply in case of intervention.
(2.3) MV1(x) represents P1’s payoff just after her intervention.
(2.4) similarly, HV2(x) represents P2’s payoff following P1’s intervention.
Moreover, for any V ∈ C2(Rd) we can consider the infinitesimal generator of the uncontrolled state
variable X:
AV = b · ∇V + 1
2
tr(σσtD2V ),
where b, σ are as in (2.1), σt denotes the transposed of σ, ∇V and D2V are the gradient and the
Hessian matrix of V , respectively. We are interested in the following quasi-variational inequalities
(QVI’s, for short) for V1, V2:
MV1 − V1 ≤ 0 everywhere (2.5)
V2 − k ≥ 0 everywhere (2.6)
HV2 − V2 = 0 in {MV1 − V1 = 0} (2.7)
V1 = h in {V2 = k} (2.8)
max{AV1 − r1V1 + f,MV1 − V1} = 0 in {V2 > k} (2.9)
max{AV2 − r2V2 + g, k − V2} = 0 in {MV1 − V1 < 0} (2.10)
Each part of the QVI’s system above can be interpreted in the following way:
(2.5) it means that is not always optimal for P1 to intervene and it is a standard condition in impulse
control theory [10, 8];
(2.6) if the current state is x and P2 chooses to stop the game, i.e. η = 0, he gains k(x) and since this
is a suboptimal strategy, we have V2(x) ≥ k(x) for all x ∈ Rd;
(2.7) by definition of Nash equilibrium we expect that P2 does not lose anything when P1 intervenes
as in [1], otherwise P2 would like to deviate, by contradicting the notion of equilibrium;
(2.9) before P2 stops the game, P1 plays as in a classic impulse control problem (e.g. [10]);
(2.10) similarly as above, when P1 does not intervene P2 solves his own optimal stopping problem (e.g.
[11]).
After all this preparation, we are ready to move to our main result, which is a verification theorem
linking Nash equilibria and solutions to the QVI system above.
2.2 The verification theorem
In this subsection, we state and proof our main verification theorem. This result will be key in order
to compute Nash equilibria in specific examples.
Theorem 2.1 Let V1, V2 : Rd → R be two given functions. Assume that (2.2) holds and set
C1 := {MV1 − V1 < 0}, C2 := {V2 − k > 0},
withMV1 as in (2.3). Moreover, assume that:
• V1 and V2 are solutions of the system of QVIs;
• Vi ∈ C2(Cj \∂Ci)∩C1(Cj)∩C(Rd), for i 6= j, and both functions have at most polynomial growth;
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• ∂Ci is a Lipschitz surface∗, and Vi’s second order derivatives are locally bounded near ∂Ci for
i = 1, 2.
Finally, let x ∈ Rd and assume that (u∗, η∗) ∈ Ax, where u∗ = (τn, δn)n≥1 is given by
τn = inf{t > τn−1 : Xt ∈ Cc1}, {δn} = argmaxδ∈Z{V1(Xτ−n + δ)− φ(Xτ−n , δ)}, n ≥ 0,
and
η∗ = inf{t ≥ 0 : V2(Xt) = k(Xt)},
with the convention τ0 = 0. Then, (u∗, η∗) is a Nash Equilibrium and Vi = Ji(x;u∗, η∗) for i = 1, 2.
Remark 2.3 First, we stress that, unlike usual impulse control problems, the candidates V1, V2 are not
required to be twice differentiable everywhere, but only in {V2 > k} and {MV1−V1 < 0} respectively.
Moreover, we observe that for the equilibrium strategies in the theorem above the right-continuity of
(Xx;ut )t≥0 implies the following:
(MV1 − V1)(Xx,u∗s ) < 0, (2.11)
δk = δ(X
x,u∗
τ−k
), (where δ(·) is as in (2.2)) (2.12)
(MV1 − V1)(Xx,u
∗
τ−k
) = 0, (HV2 − V2)(Xx,u
∗
τ−k
) = 0 (2.13)
(V2 − k)(Xη∗) = 0, (on {η∗ <∞}) (2.14)
(V2 − k)(Xs) > 0, (when P2 plays η∗) (2.15)
for every strategies u and η such that both (u∗, η), (u, η∗) belong to Ax, for every s ∈ [0, η) and every
τk <∞.
Proof. Let Vi(x) = Ji(x;u∗, η∗) for i = 1, 2. By definition of Nash Equilibrium we have to prove that
V1(x) ≥ J1(x;u, η∗) and V2(x) ≥ J2(x;u∗, η) for every (u, η) such that both (u∗, η), (u, η∗) belong to
Ax. The proof is performed in three steps.
Step 1 : We show that V1(x) ≥ J1(x;u, η∗). Let u be a strategy such that (u, η∗) ∈ Ax. Thanks to the
regularity assumptions and by approximation arguments of Theorem 2.1 in [25] (for more details see
the proof of Theorem 3.3 in [1]), we can assume without loss of generality that V1 ∈ C2(C2) ∩ C(Rd).
For each r > 0 and n ∈ N, we set
τr,n = τr ∧ n ∧ η∗
with τr = inf{s > 0 : Xs 6∈ B(x, r)}, where B(x, r) is an open ball with radius r and centre in x. As
usual, we adopt the convention inf ∅ = +∞. Applying Itô’s formula to e−r1sV1(Xs) between time zero
and τr,n and taking conditional expectations on both sides give
V1(x) =Ex
e−r1τr,nV1(Xτr,n)− ∫ τr,n
0
e−r1s(AV1 − r1V1)(Xs)ds−
∑
k:τk≤τr,n
e−r1τk(V1(Xτk)− V1(Xτ−k ))
 .
From (2.10) it follows that
(AV1 − r1V1)(Xs) ≤ −f(Xs)
for all s ∈ [0, η∗). Moreover, using (2.5) we also have:
V1(Xτ−k
) ≥MV1(Xτ−k ) ≥ V1(Xτ−k + δ)− φ(Xτ−k , δ) = V1(Xτk)− φ(Xτ−k , δ).
Therefore,
V1(x) ≥ Ex
e−r1τr,nV1(Xτr,n) + ∫ τr,n
0
e−r1sf(Xs)ds−
∑
k:τk≤τr,n
e−r1τkφ(Xτ−k , δk)
 .
∗I.e. it is locally the graph of a Lipschitz function.
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Observe that by admissibility we have
V1(Xτr,n) ≤ C
(
1 + |Xτr,n |p
) ≤ C (1 + ‖X‖p∞) ∈ L1(Ω),
for some constants C > 0 and p ∈ N. Thus, we can use dominated convergence theorem and pass to
the limit, first as r →∞ and then for n→∞. Finally, because of (2.8), we obtain
V1(x) ≥ Ex
∫ η∗
0
e−r1sf(Xs)ds−
∑
k:τk≤η∗
e−r1τkφ(Xτ−k , δk) + e
−r1η∗h(Xη∗)1{η∗<∞}
 = J1(x;u, η∗).
Step 2 : We show that V2(x) ≥ J2(x;u∗, η). Let η be a [0,∞]-valued stopping time such that (u∗, η) ∈
Ax. Thanks to regularity assumptions and by the same approximation argument as before, we can
assume again without loss of generality that V2 ∈ C2(C1) ∩ C(Rd). Arguing exactly as in Step 1 we
obtain
V2(x)=Ex
e−r2τr,nV2(Xτr,n)−∫ τr,n
0
e−r2s(AV2−r2V2)(Xs)ds−
∑
k:τk≤τr,n
e−r2τk
(
V2(Xτk)−V2(Xτ−k )
) ,
for the localizing sequence τr,n = τr ∧ n ∧ η (r > 0, n ∈ N), where τr = inf{s > 0 : Xs 6∈ B(x, r)}.
From (2.9) it follows that
(AV2 − r2V2)(Xs) ≤ −g(Xs)
for all s ∈ [0, η). Moreover, due to (2.7) and (2.13) we obtain
V2(Xτ−k
) = HV2(Xτ−k ) = V2((Xτ−k + δk) + ψ((Xτ−k , δk) = V2(Xτk) + ψ(Xτ−k , δk).
Then,
V2(x) ≥ Ex
e−r2τr,nV2(Xτr,n) + ∫ τr,n
0
e−r2sg(Xs)ds+
∑
k:τk≤τr,n
e−r2τkψ(Xτ−k , δk)

and as before we can use dominated convergence theorem and pass to the limit so that using (2.8) we
obtain
V2(x) ≥ Ex
∫ η
0
e−r1sg(Xs)ds+
∑
k:τk≤η
e−r1τkψ(Xτ−k , δk) + e
−r2ηk(Xη)1{η<∞}
 = J2(x;u∗, η).
Step 3 : Let V1(x) = J1(x;u∗, η∗). We argue as in Step 1, with equalities instead of inequalities by the
property of u∗. Similarly for P2 with V2(x) = J2(x;u∗, η∗). 
3 An impulse controller-stopper game with linear payoffs
In the next sections 3.1-3.4 we provide an application of the Verification Theorem 2.1 to an impulse
game with a one-dimensional state variable evolving essentially as a Brownian motion, which can be
shifted by P1’s impulses and stopped by P2, and where both players want to maximise linear payoffs.
We find two types of Nash equilibria for this game, depending on whether P1 finds it convenient or not
to force P2 to stop the game. For both types, we provide quasi-explicit expressions for the equilibrium
payoff functions and related strategies. Our findings will be illustrated by some numerical examples.
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3.1 Setting
We are in a more specific setting than before. This time, the state variable is one-dimensional, while
the players have the following linear payoffs for x ∈ R:
f(x) = x− s, φ(x) = c+ λ|δ|, h(x) = ax,
g(x) = q − x, ψ(x) = d+ γ|δ|, k(x) = −bx,
with s, c, λ, a, q, d, γ, b positive constants fulfilling
a < λ and b < γ. (3.1)
Hence, given an initial state x and an impulse strategy u = (τn, δn)n≥1, we define the controlled
process Xx;ut as
Xt = X
x;u
t = x+ σWt +
∑
n:τn≤t
δn, t ≥ 0,
where W is a standard one dimensional Brownian motion and σ > 0 is a fixed parameter. Moreover,
we assume that the two players have the same discount factor r1 = r2 = r such that
1− λr > 0 and 1− br > 0. (3.2)
The players’ payoff functions are given by
J1(x;u, η) = Ex
∫ η
0
e−rt(Xt − s)dt−
∑
n:τn≤η
e−rτn(c+ λ|δn|) + ae−rηXη1{η<∞}
 ,
J2(x;u, η) = Ex
∫ η
0
e−rt(q −Xt)dt+
∑
n:τn≤η
e−rτn(d+ γ|δn|)− be−rηXη1{η<∞}
 .
Therefore in this game P1 can shift the state variable X by intervening with impulses in order to keep
it high enough, while paying some costs at each intervention time, until the end of the game, which is
decided by P2. In addition to that P2, who want to keep X low, might gain something each time P1
intervenes. At the end of the game, P1 (resp. P2) receives (resp. looses) some amount proportional
to X. Hence, depending on whether her terminal payoff is high enough, P1 might want to end the
game soon, by forcing P2 to do that.
Our goal is to find some Nash equilibrium by solving the QVI problem in (2.5)-(2.10). More
specifically, a heuristic analysis of the QVI system will help us finding a couple of quasi-explicit
candidates W1, W2 for the equilibrium payoff functions of the game V1, V2. We recall the optimal
impulse size and the intervention operators in this setting
{δ(x)} = argmaxδ∈Z {W1(x+ δ)− c− λ|δ|} ,
MW1(x) = W1(x+ δ(x))− c− λ|δ(x)|,
HW2(x) = W2(x+ δ(x)) + d+ γ|δ(x)|,
together with the infinitesimal generator of the uncontrolled state variable
AW (x) = 1
2
σ2W ′′(x), x ∈ R.
Before giving the QVI system in this case, let us introduce the continuation regions for both players
C1 = {x ∈ R : W1(x+ δ(x))− c− λ|δ(x)| < W1(x)},
C2 = {x ∈ R : W2(x) + bx = 0},
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so that the respective intervention regions are given by Cci for i = 1, 2. Now, the QVIs system becomes
W1(x+ δ(x))− c− λ|δ(x)| −W1(x) ≤ 0, x ∈ R,
W2(x)− bx ≥ 0, x ∈ R,
W2(x+ δ(x)) + d+ γ|δ(x)| −W2(x) = 0, x ∈ Cc1,
W1(x)− ax = 0, x ∈ Cc2,
max
{
σ2
2
W ′′2 (x)− rW2(x) + q − x,−xb−W2(x)
}
= 0, x ∈ C1,
max
{
σ2
2
W ′′1 (x)− rW1(x) + x− s, (MW1 −W1)(x)
}
= 0, x ∈ C2.
A first look at the system suggests the following representation for W1 and W2:
W1(x) =
 ax x ∈ C
c
2
ϕ1(x) x ∈ C1 ∩ C2
MW1(x) x ∈ Cc1 ∩ C2
(3.3)
W2(x) =
 −bx x ∈ C
c
2
ϕ2(x) x ∈ Cc1 ∩ C2
HW2(x) x ∈ Cc1 ∩ C2,
(3.4)
where ϕ1 and ϕ2 are solution to the ODEs
1
2
σ2ϕ′′1(x)− rϕ1(x) + x− s = 0,
1
2
σ2ϕ′′2(x)− rϕ2(x) + q − x = 0. (3.5)
Hence, for each x ∈ R, we have:
ϕ1(x) = C11e
θx + C12e
−θx +
x− s
r
, ϕ2(x) = C21e
θx + C22e
−θx +
q − x
r
, (3.6)
where C11, C12, C21, C22 are real parameters and θ =
√
2r/σ2.
3.2 An equilibrium with no simultaneous interventions
In this subsection we push our heuristics further by focusing on a first type of Nash equilibrium, where
simultaneous interventions are not allowed. We mean by that we are looking for an equilibrium of
threshold type, where P1 intervenes each time X falls below a certain level, say x¯1, in which case P1
applies an impulse moving the state variable towards an optimal level x∗1 belonging to the continuation
region of both players. On the other hand, P2 wait until X is too high for him, i.e. until X crosses
some upper level, say x¯2, at which point P2 decides to stop the game. The heuristics will lead us to
propose candidates for the equilibrium payoffs and related strategies, which will be then checked to
be the correct ones subject to some additional conditions. Such additional conditions will be checked
in some numerical examples.
Heuristics. Loosely speaking, since P1 is happy when X is high while P2 prefers it to be low, we
make the following ansatz about the continuation regions:
Cc1 = (−∞, x¯1] (P1 intervenes),
C1 ∩ C2 = (x¯1, x¯2) (no one intervenes),
Cc2 = [x¯2,∞) (P2 intervenes).
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Hence, we can rewrite (3.3)-(3.4) as
W1(x) =
 ax, x ∈ [x¯2,∞)ϕ1(x), x ∈ (x¯1, x¯2)MW1(x), x ∈ (−∞, x¯1] (3.7)
W2(x) =
 −bx, x ∈ [x¯2,∞)ϕ2(x), x ∈ (x¯1, x¯2)HW2(x), x ∈ (−∞, x¯1] (3.8)
Let us find more explicit expressions for the operatorsMW1 and HW2. In this example, it is natural
to restrict the analysis to δ ≥ 0 since P1 prefers high values of Xx,u. Hence, whenever he intervenes
he will always move the process X to the right, so that
MW1(x) = sup
δ≥0
{W1(x+ δ)− c− λ|δ|} = sup
y≥x
{W1(y)− c− λ(y − x)} .
Here we focus on the case where the maximum point belongs to (x¯1, x¯2), in other words P1 does not
force P2 to stop. In particular, we have W1(x∗1) = ϕ(x∗1) and
ϕ(x∗1) = max
y∈(x¯1, x¯2)
{ϕ(y)− λy} , i.e. ϕ′1(x∗1) = λ, ϕ′′1(x∗1) ≤ 0, x¯1 < x∗1 < x¯2.
Therefore, we obtain
MW1(x) = ϕ1(x∗1)− c− λ(x∗1 − x), HW2(x) = ϕ2(x∗1) + d+ γ(x∗1 − x).
The parameters appearing in the expressions for W1 and W2 must be chosen so as to satisfy the
regularity assumptions in the verification theorem, i.e.
W1 ∈ C2((−∞, x¯1] ∪ (x¯1, x¯2)) ∩ C1(−∞, x¯2) ∩ C(R),
W2 ∈ C2((x¯1, x¯2) ∪ (x¯2, ∞)) ∩ C1(x¯1, ∞) ∩ C(R).
We can summarize the description of our candidates for equilibrium payoffs in the following
Ansatz 3.1 Let W1 and W2 be as in (3.7)-(3.8) where the parameters involved
(C11, C12, C21, C22, x¯1, x¯2, x
∗
1)
satisfy the order condition
x¯1 < x
∗
1 < x¯2, (3.9)
and the following equations
ϕ′1(x
∗
1) = λ and ϕ
′′(x∗1) ≤ 0 (optimality of x∗1)
ϕ′1(x¯1) = λ (C1-pasting in x¯1)
ϕ′2(x¯2) = −b (C1-pasting in x¯2)
ϕ1(x¯1) = ϕ(x
∗
1)− c− λ(x∗1 − x¯1) (C0-pasting in x¯1)
ϕ1(x¯2) = ax¯2 (C0-pasting in x¯2)
ϕ2(x¯1) = ϕ2(x
∗
1) + d+ γ(x
∗
1 − x¯1) (C0-pasting in x¯1)
ϕ2(x¯2) = −bx¯2 (C0-pasting in x¯2)
(3.10)
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Reparameterization. We are going to conveniently reparameterize the equations above in order
to reduce their complexity. Using the expressions in (3.6) we can rewrite (3.10) as follows
θC11e
θx∗1 − θC12e−θx∗1 + 1
r
= λ (3.11a)
θC11e
θx¯1 − θC12e−θx¯1 + 1
r
= λ (3.11b)
θC21e
θx¯2 − θC22e−θx¯2 − 1
r
= −b (3.11c)
C11e
θx¯1 + C12e
−θx¯1 +
x¯1 − s
r
= C11e
θx∗1 + C12e
−θx∗1 +
x∗1 − s
r
− c− λ(x∗1 − x¯1) (3.11d)
C11e
θx¯2 + C12e
−θx¯2 +
x¯2 − s
r
= ax¯2 (3.11e)
C21e
θx¯1 + C22e
−θx¯1 +
q − x¯1
r
= C21e
θx∗1 + C22e
−θx∗1 +
q − x∗1
r
+ d+ γ(x∗1 − x¯1) (3.11f)
C21e
θx¯2 + C22e
−θx¯2 +
q − x¯2
r
= −bx¯2 (3.11g)
So, subtracting (3.11b) to (3.11a) we obtain
C11 = −1− λr
rθ
1
eθx
∗
1 + eθx¯1
, C12 =
1− λr
rθ
eθ(x
∗
1+x¯1)
eθx
∗
1 + eθx¯1
.
Then, adding (3.11c) to (3.11g) we find
C21 =
e−θx¯2
2r
[
(1− br)
(
x¯2 +
1
θ
)
− q
]
, C22 =
eθx¯2
2r
[
(1− br)
(
x¯2 − 1
θ
)
− q
]
.
Hence, by substitution, we are reduced to solving the following sub-system
−21− λr
rθ
eθx¯1 − eθx∗1
eθx¯1 + eθx
∗
1
+
1− λr
r
(x¯1 − x∗1) + c = 0 (3.12a)
−1− λr
rθ
e2θx¯2
eθx
∗
1 + eθx¯1
+ ((1− ar)x¯2 − s)e
θx¯2
r
+
1− λr
rθ
eθ(x
∗
1+x¯1)
eθx
∗
1 + eθx¯1
= 0 (3.12b)
e−θx¯2
2r
[
(1− br)
(
x¯2 +
1
θ
)
− q
]
(eθx¯1 − eθx∗1 ) + e
θx¯2
2r
[
(1− br)
(
x¯2 − 1
θ
)
− q
]
(e−θx¯1 − e−θx∗1 )
+
1− γr
r
(x∗1 − x¯1)− d = 0 (3.12c)
Now, the change of variable z = eθ(x
∗
1−x¯1) turns equation (3.12a) into the following
ln z − 2
(
z − 1
z + 1
)
− crθ
1− λr = 0, (3.13)
which has a unique solution z˜ > 1. Indeed, let F (z) := ln z−2( z−1z+1 )− crθ1−λr and observe that it satisfies
F ′(z) > 0 for all z > 1. Moreover z = eθ(x
∗
1−x¯1) > 1 due to the order condition (3.9), F (1) < 0 and
limz→+∞ F (z) = +∞. Therefore, there is only one value z˜ such that F (z˜) = 0, which can be easily
computed numerically.
Now, in order to solve (3.12b) and (3.12c) we perform a second change of variable, w = eθ(x¯2−x¯1),
leading to the following equations
−1− λr
rθ
w2eθx¯1
z˜ + 1
+ ((1− ar)x¯2 − s) e
θx¯1w
r
+
1− λr
rθ
eθx
∗
1
z˜ + 1
= 0, (3.14a)
1− z˜
2rw
[
(1− br)
(
x¯2 +
1
θ
)
− q
]
+
w(z˜ − 1)
2rz˜
[
(1− br)
(
x¯2 − 1
θ
)
− q
]
+
1− γr
θr
ln z˜ − d = 0.(3.14b)
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Notice that (3.14a) is linear in x¯2, hence it can be easily solved in terms of z˜ and w, to get
x¯2 =
(
1− λr
θw
w2 − z˜
z˜ + 1
+ s
)
1
1− ar . (3.15)
Regarding (3.14b), it can be rewritten as
−z˜
[
(1− br)
(
x¯2 +
1
θ
)
− q
]
+ w2
[
(1− br)
(
x¯2 − 1
θ
)
− q
]
+
2z˜w
z˜ − 1
(
1− γr
θ
ln z˜ − rd
)
= w4
(1− br)(1− λr)
θ(1− ar)(z˜ + 1) + w
3
[
(1− br)
(
s
1− ar −
1
θ
)
− q
]
+ 2z˜w2
(
1
z˜ − 1
(
(1− γr)
θ
ln z˜ − rd
)
− (1− br)(1− λr)
θ(1− ar)(z˜ + 1)
)
+ z˜w
(
q − (1− br)
(
s
1− ar +
1
θ
))
+
(1− br)(1− λr)z˜2
θ(1− ar)(z˜ + 1) = 0. (3.16)
The equation for w above is a quartic equation for which explicit formulae for its roots are available.
However, since they are quite cumbersome and not easy to use, we are going to solve it numerically,
leaving the analysis for later. Once the two new parameters z˜ and w˜ are found, by solving numerically
the respective equations above, the thresholds x¯1, x¯2 and the optimal level for P1, x∗1, can be deduced
automatically. It remains to check under which additional conditions such thresholds correspond to a
Nash equilibrium of our original linear game. This will be done in the next paragraph.
Characterization of the equilibrium and verification. The next proposition summarizes our
findings and establish the link between the solutions z˜ and w˜ to the equations above with the Nash
equilibrium of threshold type we are looking for, provided some additional inequalities are fulfilled.
Proposition 3.1 Assume that there exists a solution (z˜, w˜) to (3.13)-(3.16) such that 1 < z˜ < w˜
and additionally
0 ≤ (1− br)(1− λr)(w˜
2 − z˜)
θw˜(1− ar)(z˜ + 1) +
1− br
1− ar s− q <
1− br
θ
, (3.17)(
1− br
1− ar
(
(1− λr)(w˜2 − z˜)
θw˜(z˜ + 1)
+ s
)
− q
)
(w˜ − 1)2 + 1− br
θ
(1 + 2w˜ ln w˜ − w˜2) > 0. (3.18)
Then a Nash equilibrium for the game in Section 3 exists and it is given by the pair (u∗, η∗), where
u∗ = (τn, δn)n≥1 is defined by
τn = inf {t > τn−1;Xt ∈ (−∞, x¯1]} , δn = (x∗1 − x)1(−∞,x¯1](x),
and
η∗ = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt ∈ [x¯2, +∞)},
where the thresholds x¯1, x∗1 and x¯2 satisfy
x∗1 = x¯2 +
ln z − lnw
θ
, x¯1 = x¯2 − lnw
θ
, x¯2 =
(
1− λr
θw˜
w˜2 − z˜
z˜ + 1
+ s
)
1
1− ar .
Moreover, the functions W1, W2 in Ansatz 3.1 coincide with the equilibrium payoff functions V1, V2,
i.e.
V1 ≡W1, and V2 ≡W2.
Proof. The proof consists in checking all the conditions needed to apply the Verification Theorem (2.1).
First, notice that by construction the functions W1 and W2 satisfy all required regularity properties,
i.e. W1 and W2 have polynomial growth, W1 ∈ C2((−∞, x¯2)/{x¯1}) ∩ C1 ((−∞, x¯2)) ∩ C(R) and
W2 ∈ C2 ((x¯1,∞)/{x¯2}) ∩ C1 ((x¯1,∞)) ∩ C(R).
Moreover Lemmas A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix grant the optimality of the impulse δ(x), i.e.
{δ(x)} = argmaxδ∈Z {W1(x+ δ)− c− λ|δ|}
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together with the properties
MW1 −W1 ≤ 0, W2(x) + bx ≥ 0, x ∈ R.
Next, we show that for all x ∈ {MW1 −W1 = 0} = (−∞, x¯1], we have W2(x) = HW2(x). Indeed, by
definition of HW2 we have:
HW2(x) = W2(x+ δ(x)) + d+ γ|δ(x)| = W2(x∗1) + d+ γ(x∗1 − x)
= ϕ2(x
∗
1) + d+ γ(x
∗
1 − x) = W2(x) ∀x ∈ (−∞, x¯1].
Now, let x ∈ {MW1 −W1 < 0}. We have to prove that
max{AW2(x)− rW2(x) + q − x, −bx−W2(x)} = 0.
Since {MW1 −W1 < 0} = (x¯1, ∞), we can consider two separate cases. In (x¯1, x¯2) we have −bx −
W2(x) < 0 and
AW2(x)− rW2(x) + q − x = Aϕ2(x)− rϕ2(x) + q − x = 0
since ϕ2 is solution to the ODE (3.5). On the other hand, in [x¯2, ∞) we know that −bx = W2(x),
then we have to check that AW2(x) − rW2(x) + q − x ≤ 0 for all x ∈ [x¯2, ∞). First, notice that
W2(x) = −bx and AW2(x) = 0. Hence, we are reduced to checking the inequality
AW2(x)− rW2(x) + q − x = brx+ q − x = q − (1− br)x ≤ 0. (3.19)
Since by assumption 1− br > 0, the function x 7→ q− (1− br)x is decreasing, so we just need to check
whether the inequality holds in x¯2, i.e. (1− br)x¯2 − q ≥ 0 which is satisfied by (3.17).
To conclude our verification that the candidate equilibrium payoffs satisfy the QVI system, we
are left with checking that −bx − W2(x) = 0 implies W1(x) = ax, and that, on the other side,
−bx−W2(x) < 0 implies
max{AW1(x)− rW1(x) + x− s,MW1(x)−W1(x)} = 0.
Now, the first implication holds by definition, while the second one boils down to proving
max{AW1(x)− rW2(x) + x− s,MW1(x)−W1(x)} = 0, x ∈ (−∞, x¯2).
For x ∈ (x¯1, x¯2) we haveMW1(x)−W1(x) < 0 and, as before,
AW1(x)− rW1(x) + x− s = Aϕ1(x)− rϕ1(x) + x− s = 0
as ϕ1 is solution to the ODE (3.5). For x ∈ (−∞, x¯1] we know that MW1(x) − W1(x) = 0 and
therefore we have to check that
AW1(x)− rW1(x) + x− s ≤ 0, x ∈ (−∞, x¯1].
To do that, recall first that W1(x) = ϕ1(x∗1)− c− λ(x∗1 − x) and AW1(x) = 0, which gives
AW1(x)− rW1(x) + x− s = −rϕ1(x∗1) + rc+ rλ(x∗1−x)+x−s
= −r(ϕ1(x¯1)+c+λ(x∗1−x¯1))+rc+rλ(x∗1−x)+x−s
= −rϕ1(x¯1)− rλ(x− x¯1) + x− s,
since ϕ1(x¯1) = ϕ1(x∗1) − c − λ(x∗1 − x¯1). Notice that, since by assumption 1 − λr > 0, the function
x 7→ −rϕ1(x¯1) − rλ(x − x¯1) + x − s is increasing in x. As a result, we only need to prove that the
desired inequality holds for x = x¯1, i.e.
−rϕ1(x¯1) + x¯1 − s ≤ 0,
which is verified since Aϕ1(x¯1) − rϕ1(x¯1) + x¯1 − s = 0 and Aϕ1(x¯1) = rϕ1(x¯1) − x¯1 + s ≥ 0, due to
ϕ′′1(x¯1) ≥ 0.
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To finish the proof, we check that equilibrium strategies are x-admissible for every x ∈ R. By
construction, the controlled process never exits from (x¯1, x¯2)∪{x}, so that supt≥0|Xt| ∈ Lp(Ω) holds.
It is easy to check that all the other conditions are satisfied provided we show the following:
Ex
∑
k≥1
e−rτk(c+ λ|δk|)
 < +∞. (3.20)
To start, let us assume that the initial state x is x∗1. The idea is to write τk as a sum of independent
and identically distributed copies of some exit time (as in the proof of Proposition 4.7 in [1]). Denote
by µ the exit time of the process x∗1 + σW from (x¯1, x¯2) where W is a one-dimensional Brownian
motion. Then each time τk can be decomposed as τk =
∑k
l≥1 ζl where ζl are i.i.d. random variables
with the same law as µ. We can now show (3.20). As δk = δ1 = x∗1 − x¯1 for all k ≥ 1, we have
Ex∗1
∑
k≥1
e−rτk(c+ λ|δk|)
 ≤ (c+ λδ1)Ex∗1
∑
k≥1
e−rτ1

= (c+ λδ1)Ex∗1
∑
k≥1
e−r
∑k
l=1 ζl

= (c+ λδ1)Ex∗1
∑
k≥1
Πkl≥1e
−rζl

and, by the Fubini-Tonelli theorem and the independence of (ζl)l≥1, we get∑
k≥1
Πkl≥1Ex∗1
[
e−rζl
] ≤∑
k≥1
(
Ex∗1
[
e−rµ
])k
,
which is a convergent geometric series, since µ ≥ 0. Then, for any x ∈ (x¯1, x¯2) same arguments hold
whereas, when x ∈ [x¯2, +∞), P2 stops as soon as the game starts and, as a consequence, P1 cannot
apply any impulse, hence, the condition is satisfied. Finally, if x ∈ (−∞, x¯1] we have
Ex
∑
k≥1
e−rτk(c+ λ|δk|)
 = c+ λ|x∗1 − x|+ Ex∗1
∑
k≥1
e−rτk(c+ λ|δk|)
 < +∞.
since supt≥0|Xt| ∈ Lp(Ω). 
3.3 An equilibrium where the controller activates the stopper
We turn now to another kind of Nash equilibrium, where P1 behaves similarly as in the previous type
with the main difference that this time when the state variable X falls below a given threshold, he
will intervene and send X directly to the stopping region of P2, hence forcing him to stop the game
instantaneously. In particular, this would be an equilibrium in which the two players act at the same
time. The approach we are going to use to characterize such an equilibrium follows the same steps as
in the previous subsection.
Heuristics. We start with some heuristics leading us to formulate a conjecture on the equations the
thresholds characterizing this equilibrium should reasonably satisfy. Arguing as before, we expect the
candidates for equilibrium payoffs to be of the following type (3.3)-(3.4) as
W1(x) =
 ax in[x¯2,∞)ϕ1(x) in(x¯1, x¯2)MW1(x) in(−∞, x¯1] (3.21)
W2(x) =
 −bx in[x¯2,∞)ϕ2(x) in(x¯1, x¯2)HW2(x) in(−∞, x¯1] (3.22)
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for suitable thresholds x¯i, i = 1, 2.
Now, according to the type of equilibrium we want to identify, we investigate the case in which the
maximum point of the function y 7→W1(y)−λy belongs to [x¯2, ∞), meaning that when P1 intervenes
he is applying an optimal impulse moving the state variable to the stopping region of her competitor.
Thus in this case we have
MW1(x) = sup
y≥x¯2
(ay − λy).
Therefore, we have the following scenarios:
• if a > λ ⇒ x∗1 →∞;
• if a = λ ⇒ x∗1 could be any x ≥ x¯2;
• if a < λ ⇒ x∗1 = x¯2.
Clearly, the only interesting case is a < λ, so that x∗1 = x¯2. As a consequence, this type of equilibrium
will be characterized only by two thresholds. Similarly as in the previous subsection, we are going to
characterize the parameters (C11, C12, C21, C22) and the thresholds (x¯1, x¯2) by exploiting the smooth
pasting conditions coming from the regularity assumptions postulated in Theorem 2.1. By doing so,
we obtain 
ϕ′1(x¯1) = λ (C1-pasting in x¯1)
ϕ1(x¯2) = ax¯2 (C0-pasting in x¯2)
ϕ1(x¯1) = ax¯2 − c− λ(x¯2 − x¯1) (C0-pasting in x¯1)
ϕ′2(x¯2) = −b (C1-pasting in x¯2)
ϕ2(x¯2) = −bx¯2 (C0-pasting in x¯2)
ϕ2(x¯1) = −bx¯2 + d+ γ(x¯2 − x¯1) (C0-pasting in x¯1)
(3.23)
together with the order condition x¯1 < x¯2.
Reparameterization. We first rewrite (3.23) as
θC11e
θx¯1 − θC12e−θx¯1 + 1
r
= λ (3.24a)
θC21e
θx¯2 − θC22e−θx¯2 − 1
r
= −b (3.24b)
C11e
θx¯2 + C12e
−θx¯2 +
x¯2 − s
r
= ax¯2 (3.24c)
C11e
θx¯1 + C12e
−θx¯1 +
x¯1 − s
r
= (a− λ)x¯2 + λx¯1 − c (3.24d)
C21e
θx¯2 + C22e
−θx¯2 +
q − x¯2
r
= −bx¯2 (3.24e)
C21e
θx¯1 + C22e
−θx¯1 +
q − x¯1
r
= (γ − b)x¯2 + d− γx¯1 (3.24f)
Then, dividing (3.24a) by θ and adding it to (3.24d), we obtain a linear equation in C11 that can
be solved giving
C11 =
e−θx¯1
2
[
(a− λ)x¯2 −
(
x¯1 +
1
θ
)
1− λr
r
− c+ s
r
]
, (3.25)
and consequently
C12 =
eθx¯1
2
[
(a− λ)x¯2 −
(
x¯1 − 1
θ
)
1− λr
r
− c+ s
r
]
. (3.26)
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A similar manipulation of equations (3.24b) and (3.24e) yields
C21 =
e−θx¯2
2r
[
(1− br)
(
x¯2 +
1
θ
)
− q
]
, (3.27)
C22 =
eθx¯2
2r
[
(1− br)
(
x¯2 − 1
θ
)
− q
]
. (3.28)
At this point, plugging (3.25) and (3.26) in (3.24c) we obtain
eθ(x¯2−x¯1)
2
[
(a− λ)x¯2 −
(
x¯1 +
1
θ
)
1− λr
r
− c+ s
r
]
+
e−θ(x¯2−x¯1)
2
×
[
(a− λ)x¯2 −
(
x¯1 − 1
θ
)
1− λr
r
− c+ s
r
]
+
1− ar
r
x¯2 − s
r
= 0
which, noting that x¯1 = x¯2− lnwθ and applying the change of variable w = eθ(x¯2−x¯1), can be rewritten
as
w
[
(1− λr)(lnw − 1)
rθ
− 1− ar
r
x¯2 − c+ s
r
]
+
1
w
[
(1− λr)(lnw + 1)
rθ
− 1− ar
r
x¯2 − c+ s
r
]
+2
(1− ar)x¯2 − s
r
= 0.
This is a linear equation in x¯2, yielding
x¯2 =
(1− λr)((lnw − 1)w2 + lnw + 1)− crθ(w2 + 1)
θ(1− ar)(w − 1)2 +
s
1− ar . (3.29)
Proceeding analogously with (3.24f), we obtain the following alternative expression for x¯2
x¯2 =
q
1− br +
w + 1
θ(w − 1) +
2(θrd− (1− γr) lnw)w
θ(1− br)(w − 1)2 . (3.30)
Then, by equating (3.29) to (3.30), we obtain an equation in w:
G(w) :=
(1− λr)((lnw − 1)w2 + lnw + 1)− crθ(w2 + 1)
θ(1− ar)(w − 1)2 +
s
1− ar
− q
1− br −
w + 1
θ(w − 1) −
2(θrd− (1− γr) lnw)w
θ(1− br)(w − 1)2 = 0 (3.31)
which has at least a solution, say ŵ > 1, due to limw→+∞G(w) = +∞ and limw→1G(w) = −∞. The
first limit follows from the highest order term, w2 lnw, being multiplied by 1−λr1−ar > 0 (cf. (3.2)). On
the other hand, the second limit follows from (3.1):
lim
w→1
G(w) = lim
w→1
1
(w − 1)2
[
− 2cr
1− ar −
2rd
1− br
]
= −∞.
Characterization of the equilibrium and verification. The next proposition summarizes our
characterization of this Nash equilibrium in terms of only one parameter, ŵ, provided some further
conditions, that will be checked numerically in the next subsection.
Proposition 3.2 Assume that there exists ŵ solution to (3.31) such that
(1− λr)(ŵ − ŵ ln ŵ − 1) + crθŵ > 0, (3.32)
0 ≤ (1− br)(ŵ2 − 1) + 2(θrd− (1− γr) ln ŵ)ŵ < (1− br)(ŵ − 1)2. (3.33)
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Then a Nash equilibrium for the game in Section 3 exists and it is given by the strategies (u∗, η∗), with
u∗ = (τn, δn)n≥1 defined by
τn = inf {t > τn−1;Xt ∈ (−∞, x¯1]} , δn = (x¯2 − x)1(−∞,x¯1](x)
and
η∗ = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt ∈ [x¯2, +∞)},
where the thresholds satisfy
x¯1 = x¯2 − ln ŵ
θ
, x¯2 =
q
1− br +
ŵ + 1
θ(ŵ − 1) +
2(θrd− (1− γr) ln ŵ)ŵ
θ(1− br)(ŵ − 1)2 .
Moreover, the functions W1, W2 in Ansatz 3.1 coincide with the equilibrium payoff functions V1, V2,
i.e.
V1 ≡W1 and V2 ≡W2.
Proof. We proceed as for the previous equilibrium, by checking all the conditions necessary to apply
the verification theorem. First of all, the functions W1,W2 satisfy by construction all required regu-
larity properties, i.e. W1 ∈ C2((−∞, x¯2)/{x¯1}) ∩ C1 ((−∞, x¯2)) ∩ C(R), W2 ∈ C2 ((x¯1,∞)/{x¯2}) ∩
C1 ((x¯1,∞)) ∩ C(R) and both have at most polynomial growth.
Next, Lemmas A.3 and A.4 give
{δ(x)} = argmaxδ∈Z {W1(x+ δ)− c− λ|δ|}
together with
MW1(x)−W1(x) ≤ 0, W2(x) + bx ≥ 0,
for all x ∈ R. Let x ∈ {MW1 −W1 = 0} = (−∞, x¯1]. By definition of HW2 we have:
HW2(x) = W2(x+ δ(x)) + d+ γ|δ(x)| = W2(x¯2) + d+ γ(x¯2 − x)
= −bx¯2 + d+ γ(x¯2 − x) = W2(x).
Now, in order to prove that
max{AW2(x)− rW2(x) + q − x, −bx−W2(x)} = 0, x ∈ (x¯1, ∞),
we consider two separate cases as for the previous equilibrium. First, for x ∈ (x¯1, x¯2), we have
−bx−W2(x) < 0 and
AW2(x)− rW2(x) + q − x = Aϕ2(x)− rϕ2(x) + q − x = 0
since ϕ2 is solution to the ODE (3.5), so the maximum between the two terms is zero. Second, we
know that −bx = W2(x) for x ∈ [x¯2, ∞), then we have to check that AW2(x) − rW2(x) + q − x ≤ 0
for any x ∈ [x¯2, ∞). Since AW2(x) = 0, we are reduced to verify the inequality
AW2(x)− rW2(x) + q − x = brx+ q − x = q − (1− br)x ≤ 0. (3.34)
Given that x 7→ q − (1− br)x is decreasing due to 1− br > 0, it suffices to show the inequality above
at the point x¯2, i.e. (1− br)x¯2 − q ≥ 0, which is implied by (3.33).
To complete the verification that W1,W2 are solutions to the QVI system, we show that in −bx −
W2(x) = 0 implies W1(x) = ax and that −bx − W2(x) < 0 yields max{AW1(x) − rW1(x) + x −
s,MW1(x) −W1(x)} = 0. The first implication holds by definition. For the second one, we have to
prove
max{AW1(x)− rW2(x) + x− s,MW1(x)−W1(x)} = 0, x ∈ (−∞, x¯2).
For x ∈ (x¯1, x¯2) we haveMW1(x)−W1(x) < 0 and as before
AW1(x)− rW1(x) + x− s = Aϕ1(x)− rϕ1(x) + x− s = 0
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as ϕ1 is solution to the ODE (3.5). For any x ∈ (−∞, x¯1] we know thatMW1(x)−W1(x) = 0, hence,
we have to check that
AW1(x)− rW1(x) + x− s = (1− λr)x+ cr − s− (a− λ)rx¯2 ≤ 0, x ∈ (−∞, x¯1].
To do so, we notice that, since by assumption 1−λr > 0, the function x 7→ (1−λr)x+cr−s−(a−λ)rx¯2
is increasing in x. Therefore, we only need to prove that the desired inequality for x = x¯1, i.e.
(1− ar)x¯2 − 1− λr
θ
lnw + cr − s ≤ 0,
which is given by Lemma A.3. Finally, the optimal strategies are x-admissible for every x ∈ R. Indeed,
by construction, the controlled process never exits from (x¯1, x¯2) ∪ {x}, so that supt≥0|Xt| ∈ Lp(Ω)
for all p ≥ 1. It is easy to check that all the other conditions are satisfied as in the first type of
equilibrium. 
3.4 Numerical experiments
In this section we will give some numerical illustrations of the equilibrium payoff functions and a
selection of comparative statics regarding the two types of Nash equilibria identified in the previous
subsections.† It is useful to remember that in order for the solutions to the QVI system to be Nash
equilibria of one of the two types, they have to satisfy either (3.17)-(3.18) or (3.32)-(3.33). Before we
start, let us recall the meaning of the parameters involved:
• s and q might be interpreted as exogenous costs and gains respectively. Note that P1’s running
payoff f(x) = x− s, hence, in order to make profit P1 needs x to be greater than s, which can
fairly be considered as P1’s expense, an analogous reasoning applies for P2, but in the opposite
direction since g(x) = q − x;
• a and b can be considered as terminal payoff sensitivity to the underlying process, Xt, as we
have h(x) = ax and k(x) = −bx respectively;
• at each intervention time P1 faces a fixed cost, c, while P2 receives a fixed gain, d;
• moreover, λ is P1’s proportional cost parameter, while γ is P2’s proportional gain parameter;
• finally, r is the discount rate, the same for both players, and σ is the volatility of the state
variable.
Equilibrium with no simultaneous interventions. In order to fulfill (3.17)-(3.18), we can ob-
serve that both inequalities are satisfied for high enough values of w˜. It is possible to show via graphical
analysis that w˜, solution to (3.16), is decreasing in a, b, s and increasing in c, d, q, λ and γ. Therefore,
we have chosen small values of a, b and s to obtain the first equilibrium, Scenario A, whereas for
Scenario B we have looked for higher values and increased q and d in order to find an equilibrium.
r σ c d λ γ a b s q x¯1 x
∗
1 x¯2
Scenario A 0.01 5 500 100 20 40 0 0 1 5 -31.11 16.95 34.84
Scenario B 0.01 1.5 50 150 10 15 2 8 10 10 4.95 14.26 18.18.
where x¯1, x∗1 and x¯2 are as in Proposition 3.1.
†The numerical results in this section were obtained using R, rootSolve package.
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Figure 1: Type I Equilibria
(i) x 7→V1(x) in red, x 7→V2(x) in blue for Scenario A (ii) x 7→V1(x) in red, x 7→V2(x) in blue for Scenario B
(iii) c 7→ x¯1, x∗1, x¯2 for Scenario B (iv) λ 7→ x¯1, x∗1, x¯2 for Scenario B
(v) d 7→ x¯1, x∗1, x¯2 for Scenario B (vi) γ 7→ x¯1, x∗1, x¯2 for Scenario B
Figures 1(i)-1(ii) show how the equilibrium payoff functions behave in the selected scenarios, with
the dashed lines showing the smooth-pasting of the three components of the payoff in (3.7) and (3.8).
From Figure 1(i) to Figure 1(ii) we can see how a reduction in the volatility seems to shrink the
continuation region, hence, the players become more cautious, reducing their intervention regions
when there is more uncertainty. Another interesting fact to note is how the relative distance between
x¯1 and x¯2 becomes smaller. This can be due to the increase in P2’s terminal payoff sensitivity, b, and
the increase in P1’s exogenous cost, s. In one direction, P2 is losing more money when she decides
to terminate the game, therefore she will not stop when the state process value is too high, hence
she reduces her threshold x¯2. In the other, since P1 is facing higher exogenous costs, she pushes the
target, x∗1, as far as she can, making sure the state process is not going too low, rising the barrier x¯1.
Figures 1(iii)-1(iv)-1(v)-1(vi) represent some comparative statics of the thresholds x¯1, x∗1 and x¯2
for Scenario B. Similar graphs hold for Scenario A as well, therefore they are omitted. First, in Figure
1(iii) we can observe how an increase in P1’s fixed cost expands the gap between x¯1 and x∗1. The more
P1 has to pay at any intervention time, the less often she will intervene, lowering the threshold, x¯1,
and increasing the target, x∗1. This allows P2, who does not like high values of x, to slightly lower
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her threshold, x¯2, so as to pay less when she will stop the game. In Figure 1(iv) the behavior with
respect to the proportional cost is quite different. P1 will reduce the interventions for higher λ, with
the distance between x¯1 and x∗1 left nearly unchanged, while P2 keeps the barrier at a constant level
x¯2. In particular, P1 tends to never intervening when the proportional cost reaches its maximum,
set by the condition 1 − λr > 0. This behavior shows how P1 is quite indifferent to changes in the
proportional cost when this is not too big while she is really sensitive once it gets high. Finally, in
Figures 1(v)-1(vi) we can see that, when P2’s gains more each time P1 intervenes increases, P2 is
happy playing for longer, heightening the threshold x¯2, since she is receiving more money.
Equilibrium where P1 induces P2 to stop. To satisfy (3.32)-(3.33), we want ŵ to be neither
too high nor too low, in particular, high λ should help in (3.32) as high ŵ in (3.33). As before, via
graphical analysis it is possible to show that ŵ, solution to (3.31), is decreasing in a, b, s and increasing
in c, d, q, λ and γ. Therefore, the first instance of Nash equilibrium, Scenario B, has been selected to
have high λ and ŵ, choosing high values of c, d, q and γ and low values of b and s, whereas for Scenario
A we have looked for lower values of λ and adapted the others.
r σ c d λ γ a b s q x¯1 x¯2
Scenario A 0.01 5 100 100 25 10 24 9 45 0 22.56 32.68
Scenario B 0.01 1.5 150 125 80 25 70 15 10 15 14.27 25.72.
where x¯1 and x¯2 are as in Proposition 3.2.
Figure 2: Type II Equilibria
(i) x 7→V1(x) in red, x 7→V2(x) in blue for Scenario A (ii) x 7→V1(x) in red, x 7→V2(x) in blue for Scenario B
(iii) c 7→ x¯1, x¯2 for Scenario B (iv) λ 7→ x¯1, x¯2 for Scenario B
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(v) d 7→ x¯1, x¯2 for Scenario B (vi) γ 7→ x¯1, x¯2 for Scenario B
As before, Figure 2(i)-2(ii) represent the equilibrium payoff functions in the selected examples.
First, we can observe that the continuation region in Scenario A is shifted to the right with respect
to the one in Scenario B and we can observe that its width has not changed much from one case to
the other. Furthermore, we can notice that Scenario B is more profitable for P2 and less profitable
for P1. These two facts might be explained by the following changes from Scenario B to Scenario A:
P1’s exogenous cost, s, increases, so P1 cannot tolerate low levels of x, increasing her threshold x¯1.
Moreover, although P2’s gains, q, d and γ, decrease we do not see her threshold scale down as it would
be expected as the game is now less profitable. This is probably due to b’s reduction, which leads P2
to stop for higher values of x¯2 since she is going to lose less when she decides to stop.
Now, let us spend some words on the comparative statics in Figures 2(iii)-2(iv)-2(v)-2(vi). When
P1’s costs, c and λ, increases, Figure 2(iii)-2(iv), P1 would intervene for lower values of x and the
distance x¯2 − x¯1 will increase, even though x¯2 gets lower as well. This can be explained as follows,
with the costs increasing, P1 is less willing to intervene, reducing x¯1, even though this shift allows P2
to lower her threshold, x¯2, since she likes low values of x. When the fixed gain, d, rises, Figure 2(v),
P2 can afford the game to run for longer, increasing x¯2, as she will gain more when P1 will make her
stop. Moreover, this makes P1 heighten x¯1 in order to limit the proportional costs increment. Lastly,
we have a similar behavior to the one described above for the proportional gain, γ, Figure 2(vi).
The main difference is the speed with which the distance between the thresholds increases, higher for
proportional gain increments. This happens because, in case of proportional gain increments, P2 is
more incentivized to push x¯2 far away since the bigger the impulse the more the revenue, whereas
an analogous behavior in case of fixed gain increments would lead to a loss in the terminal payoff
outrunning the additional profit due to the fact that the gain, d, does not depend on the intensity of
the impulse P1 is playing while the losses are increasing, since they depend on P2’s threshold, −bx¯2.
Comparison between the two equilibria We conclude with a short discussion on the reasons
why P1 would play aggressively, forcing P2 to stop. To do so we compare first the two scenarios A and
B in both equilibria. So, going from Type I to Type II we see a reduction in the proportional gain,
γ, an increase in P1 terminal payoff sensitivity, b, and a reduction in P2’s exogenous gain, q, making
P2 lower her threshold, x¯2, to reduce the losses at the end of the game. Then, P1’s exogenous cost, s,
increases making P1 rise both the threshold and the target, x¯1 and x∗1 respectively. Furthermore, P1
terminal payoff sensitivity, a, increases and, intuitively incentivize P1 to let P2 end the game sooner
so to receive the terminal payoff. More specifically, since w˜ is decreasing in a, its increase makes
ln w˜ = θ(x¯2 − x¯1) decrease, hence, since the distance between the two thresholds is now smaller, P1’s
target, x∗1, is closer to P2’s barrier up to the point they coincide, x∗1 ≡ x¯2.
Regarding Scenario B, again from Type I to Type II, we observe increments in the terminal payoff
sensitivity of the two players, a and b, in particular P1’s sensitivity rises much more than in the first
scenario, hence, P1 is more incentivized to let P2 end the game. Another important change regards
the proportional cost, λ, which is very high in case P1 induces P2 to stop. As we have seen before in
the comparative statics in Figure 1(iv), P1 intervenes less and less when the proportional cost becomes
higher and higher, so it is more convenient to intervene only once, inducing P2 to stop.
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We finally observe that while we have managed to find numerical values for which only one of the
two types of Nash equilibria emerges at a time, the problem of whether the two equilibria can coexist
remains open.
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A Auxiliary results
In this appendix we have gathered some technical results used in the verification parts of Section 3
for both types of Nash equilibrium. We start with two lemmas on the continuations regions in the
equilibrium where simultaneous actions are not allowed.
Lemma A.1 Let W1 be as in (3.7). Then we have
δ(x) = (x∗1 − x)1(−∞, x∗1 ](x), x ∈ R.
Moreover
{MW1 −W1 < 0} = (x¯1, ∞) and {MW1 −W1 = 0} = (−∞, x¯1]. (A.1)
Proof. By a simple change of variable we obtain
MW1 = max
δ≥0
{W1(x+ δ)− c− λδ} = max
y≥x
{W1(y)− c− λ(y − x)}.
Let Γ(y) := W1(y) − λy. By definition of W1 we have Γ′(x¯1) = Γ′(x∗1) = 0. Moreover, the following
properties are satisfied:
(i) Γ′(x) = 0 in (−∞, x¯1];
(ii) Γ′(x) = a− λ < 0 in [x¯2, ∞);
(iii) Γ′(x) > 0 (resp. < 0) in (x¯1, x∗1) (resp. in (x∗1, x¯2)).
Properties (i) and (ii) are easily checked. Regarding (iii), recall that
Γ′(x) = ϕ′1(x)− λ = θC11eθx − θC12e−θx +
1
r
− λ, x ∈ (x¯1, x¯2).
To study its sign, notice that Γ′′(x) = θ2C11eθx + θ2C12e−θx > 0 for all x ∈ (x¯1, x˜), where x˜ is such
that eθx˜ =
√−C12/C11 = e θ2 (x∗1+x¯1). Moreover, since x˜ < x∗1 we have Γ′′(x∗1) < 0. Hence, it follows
that Γ′(x) > 0 in (x¯1, x∗1), while Γ′(x) < 0 in (x∗1, x¯2).
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As a consequence, Γ has a unique global maximum in x∗1, so that
max
y≥x
Γ(y) =
{
Γ(x∗1) in (−∞, x∗1]
Γ(x) in (x∗1, ∞)
which gives
argmaxδ≥0{W1(x+ δ)− c− λδ} =
{ {x∗1 − x} in (−∞, x∗1]
{0} in (x∗1, ∞)
This implies the first part of our statement, i.e. δ(x) = (x∗1 − x)1(−∞,x∗1 ](x). Now, to show (A.1),
notice first that
MW1(x) =
{
W1(x)− ζ(x) in (x¯1,∞)
W1(x) in (−∞, x¯1],
where we set
ζ(x) :=
{
ϕ1(x)− ϕ1(x∗1) + c+ λ(x∗1 − x) in (x¯1, x∗1]
c in (x∗1, ∞)
Now, we are going to prove that ζ > 0. By C0-pasting in x¯1 we have ϕ1(x¯1) = ϕ(x∗1)− c−λ(x∗1− x¯1),
therefore
ζ(x) = ϕ1(x)− ϕ1(x¯1)− λ(x¯1 − x) = Γ(x)− Γ(x¯1), x ∈ (x¯1, x∗1],
which is strictly positive since Γ is increasing in (x¯1, x∗1]. Hence, ζ is strictly positive and we have
{MW1 −W1 < 0} = (x¯1, ∞), {MW1 −W1 = 0} = (−∞, x¯1].

Lemma A.2 Let W2 be as in (3.8). Assume there exists a solution (z˜, w˜) to (3.13)-(3.16) such that
1 < z˜ < w˜ and
0 ≤ (1− br)(1− λr)(w˜
2 − z˜)
θw˜(1− ar)(z˜ + 1) +
1− br
1− ar s− q <
1− br
θ
,(
1− br
1− ar
(
(1− λr)(w˜2 − z˜)
θw˜(z˜ + 1)
+ s
)
− q
)
(w˜ − 1)2 + 1− br
θ
(1 + 2w˜ ln w˜ − w˜2) > 0.
Then, we have
{x ∈ R : −bx−W2(x) < 0} = (−∞, x¯2),
{x ∈ R : −bx−W2(x) = 0} = [x¯2, ∞).
Proof. First, we recall that
W2(x) =
 −bx in [x¯2, ∞)ϕ2(x) in (x¯1, x¯2)HW2(x) in (−∞, x¯1]
where
ϕ2(x) = C21e
θx + C22e
−θx +
q − x
r
.
We want to prove that ϕ2(x) > −bx in (x¯1, x¯2) and HW2(x) > −bx in (−∞, x¯1]. For the first
inequality we are interested in the conditions such that, for all x ∈ (x¯1, x¯2), we have
C21e
θx + C22e
−θx +
q − (1− br)x
r
> 0, (A.2)
or, equivalently,
eθ(x−x¯2)
[
(1− br)
(
1
θ
+ x¯2
)
− q
]
+ eθ(x¯2−x)
[
(1− br)
(
x¯2 − 1
θ
)
− q
]
+ 2 (q − (1− br)x) > 0.
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Now, applying the change of variable eθ(x¯2−x) = z > 1 to the inequality above yields
(1− br)
(
x¯2 +
1
θ
)
− q + z2
[
(1− br)
(
x¯2 − 1
θ
)
− q
]
+ 2z
(
q − (1− br)x¯2 + 1− br
θ
ln z
)
> 0.
Since ln z > 0 and 1− br > 0 by assumption, the left-side above is bigger than
(1− br)
(
x¯2 +
1
θ
)
− q + z2
[
(1− br)
(
x¯2 − 1
θ
)
− q
]
+ 2z (q − (1− br)x¯2) ,
which is quadratic in z and it can be factorized as
(z − 1)
(
z − (1− br)
(
x¯2 +
1
θ
)− q
(1− br) (x¯2 − 1θ )− q
)
.
We are going to show that our assumptions grant that the expression above is positive, which in turn
will imply (A.2). Hence, the second factor is positive if the following holds:
(1− br)
(
x¯2 − 1
θ
)
− q < 0, (1− br)x¯2 − q ≥ 0.
Then, using (3.15), the two inequalities above can be rewritten as
0 ≤ (1− br)(1− λr)(w˜
2 − z˜)
θw˜(1− ar)(z˜ + 1) +
1− br
1− ar s− q <
1− br
θ
,
which is true by assumption.
For showing the second inequality, i.e. HW2(x) > −bx in (−∞, x¯1], we observe first that
ϕ2(x
∗
1) + d+ γ(x
∗
1 − x) > −bx, x ∈ (−∞, x¯1]. (A.3)
From the C0-pasting condition in x¯1 we have that ϕ2(x¯1) = ϕ2(x∗1) + d+ γ(x∗1− x¯1), therefore we can
rewrite (A.3) as
ϕ2(x¯1) + γ(x¯1 − x) > −bx.
Since b < γ we only need to check that F (x¯1) > 0:
F (x¯1) = ϕ2(x¯1) + bx¯1 = C21e
θx¯1 + C22e
−θx¯1 +
q − (1− br)x¯1
r
,
= e−θ(x¯2−x¯1)
[
(1− br)
(
x¯2 +
1
θ
)
− q
]
+ eθ(x¯2−x¯1)
[
(1− br)
(
x¯2 − 1
θ
)
− q
]
+ 2(q − (1− br)x¯1).
Now, using again the change of variable w = eθ(x¯2−x¯1), we have x¯1 = x¯2 − lnwθ and so F (x¯1)eθ(x¯2−x¯1)
can be re-expressed as
((1− br)x¯2 − q)(w˜ − 1)2 + 1− br
θ
(1 + 2w˜ ln w˜ − w˜2),
which, using (3.15), can be rewritten as(
1− br
1− ar
(
(1− λr)(w˜2 − z˜)
θw˜(z˜ + 1)
+ s
)
− q
)
(w˜ − 1)2 + 1− br
θ
(1 + 2w˜ ln w˜ − w˜2),
which is positive by assumption. 
We conclude the appendix with two more lemmas on similar results for the other kind of equilib-
rium, where P1 forces P2 to stop the game.
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Lemma A.3 Let W1 be as in (3.7). Assume there exists a solution ŵ to (3.31) such that
(1− λr)(w − w lnw − 1) + crθw > 0.
Then we have
δ(x) = (x¯2 − x)1(−∞, x¯2](x), x ∈ R.
Moreover, we have
{MW1 −W1 < 0} = (x¯1, ∞), {MW1 −W1 = 0} = (−∞, x¯1].
Proof. First, observe that
MW1 = max
δ≥0
{W1(x+ δ)− c− λδ} = max
y≥x
{W1(y)− c− λ(y − x)}.
Let us denote Γ(y) := W1(y)− λy. By definition of W1 we have Γ′(x¯1) = 0. Moreover, the following
properties hold true:
(i) Γ′(x) = 0 in (−∞, x¯1];
(ii) Γ′(x) = a− λ < 0 in [x¯2, ∞);
(iii) Γ′(x) > 0 in (x¯1, x¯2).
As properties (i) and (ii) can be easily checked, we turn to showing (iii). Observe that, for all
x ∈ (x¯1, x¯2), one has Γ′(x) = ϕ′1(x)− λ = θC11eθx − θC12e−θx + 1r − λ, hence
Γ′(x) =
θ
2
eθ(x−x¯1)
[
(a− λ)x¯2 −
(
x¯1 +
1
θ
)
1− λr
r
− cs
r
]
− θ
2
e−θ(x−x¯1)
[
(a− λ)x¯2 −
(
x¯1 − 1
θ
)
1− λr
r
− c+ s
r
]
+
1− λr
r
.
Using the fact that x¯1 = x¯2 − ln ŵθ and setting z = eθ(x−x¯1) we can rewrite it as(
−(1− ar)x¯2 + 1− λr
θ
ln ŵ − cr + s
)
(z2 − 1)− 1− λr
θ
(z − 1)2 > 0,
which can be factorized as
(z − 1)
(
z +
1−λr
θ (ln ŵ + 1)− (1− ar)x¯2 − cr + s
1−λr
θ (ln ŵ − 1)− (1− ar)x¯2 − cr + s
)
> 0,
which is true whenever 1−λrθ (ln ŵ − 1) − (1 − ar)x¯2 − cr + s > 0. Therefore, recalling (3.29), after
some algebraic manipulation, we obtain the equivalent condition
(1− λr)(ŵ − ŵ ln ŵ − 1) + crθŵ > 0.
Hence property (iii) is fulfilled. As a consequence, Γ has a unique global maximum point in x¯2, and
the rest of the proof follows the same lines as for Lemma A.1. Hence, the details are omitted. 
Lemma A.4 Let W2 be as in (3.8). For every x ∈ R, assume there exists a solution ŵ to (3.31) such
that:
0 ≤ (1− br)(ŵ2 − 1) + 2(θrd− (1− γr) ln ŵ)ŵ < (1− br)(ŵ − 1)2.
Then, we have
{x ∈ R : W2(x) > −bx} = (−∞, x¯2), {x ∈ R : W2(x) = −bx} = [x¯2, ∞).
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Proof. First, recall that
W2(x) =
 −bx in [x¯2, ∞)ϕ2(x) in (x¯1, x¯2)HW2(x) in (−∞, x¯1]
where
ϕ2(x) = C21e
θx + C22e
−θx +
q − x
r
.
Hence, we want to prove that ϕ2(x) > −bx in (x¯1, x¯2) and HW2(x) > −bx in (−∞, x¯1]. For the first
inequality we are interested in the conditions granting
C21e
θx + C22e
−θx +
q − (1− br)x
r
> 0, x ∈ (x¯1, x¯2),
or equivalently
e−θ(x¯2−x)
[
(1− br)
(
x¯2 +
1
θ
)
− q
]
+ eθ(x¯2−x)
[
(1− br)
(
x¯2 − 1
θ
)
− q
]
+ 2(q − (1− br)x) > 0.
Letting z = eθ(x¯2−x), the above inequality holds whenever
(1− br)
(
x¯2 +
1
θ
)
− q +
[
(1− br)
(
x¯2 − 1
θ
)
− q
]
z2 + 2
(
q − (1− br)
(
x¯2 − ln z
θ
))
z > 0,
Since ln z > 0 and 1− br > 0 by assumption, the left-side above is bigger than
(1− br)
(
x¯2 +
1
θ
)
− q + z2
[
(1− br)
(
x¯2 − 1
θ
)
− q
]
+ 2z (q − (1− br)x¯2) ,
which can be factorized as in the proof of Lemma A.2 in
(z − 1)
(
z − (1− br)
(
x¯2 +
1
θ
)− q
(1− br) (x¯2 − 1θ )− q
)
.
We are going to show that our assumptions grant that the expression above is positive. We proceed
as in the proof of Lemma A.2: the second factor above is positive if the following holds
(1− br)
(
x¯2 − 1
θ
)
− q < 0, (1− br)x¯2 − q ≥ 0,
which, using (3.30), can be rewritten as
0 ≤ (1− br)(ŵ2 − 1) + 2(θrd− (1− γr) ln ŵ)ŵ < (1− br)(ŵ − 1)2,
which is true by assumption.
For the second inequality we have
−bx¯2 + d+ γ(x¯2 − x) > −bx, x ∈ (−∞, x¯1].
Since γ > b, the inequality holds whenever (γ− b)(x¯2− x¯1)+d > 0, which is always true since x¯2 > x¯1
by the ordering condition. 
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